“Well the big issue, particularly for when the 9/11 crisis occurred, was that the leadership of both the House and Senate, had wanted to let the public know that the U.S. government was still operating, in particular the legislative branch of government. So, it’s imperative to get back to normalcy as soon as possible, and this was the urgency associated with the leadership in terms of getting the police department to bring this about.”

Jim Varey
May 18, 2011
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Interview 1
Project Abstract

To commemorate the events of September 11, 2001, the Office of the House Historian conducted a series of interviews with former Members and staff of the U.S. House of Representatives. This collection of oral histories provides a multi-layered narrative of the events on Capitol Hill that day, from the morning floor proceedings, to the evacuation of the Capitol and House Office Buildings, to the press conference and impromptu gathering on the Capitol steps that evening.

These accounts reveal how the House responded to the challenges facing the nation in the weeks and months following the attack. Interviewees describe the return to work on September 12, the President’s address to a Joint Session on September 20, and the immediate changes in the legislative schedule. Some recall the implementation of new security measures, including restrictions on the mail in response to the subsequent anthrax scare. Several interviewees shed light on the role of Member offices in recovery and support efforts in the regions most affected by the violence. Individually, each interview offers insight into the long-term procedural changes that fundamentally altered the daily workings of the House. Together, the project’s collective perspective illuminates the way this dramatic event transformed the nation, from Capitol Hill to congressional districts.
Editing Practices

In preparing interview transcripts for publication, the editors sought to balance several priorities:

- As a primary rule, the editors aimed for fidelity to the spoken word and the conversational style in accord with generally accepted oral history practices.
- The editors made minor editorial changes to the transcripts in instances where they believed such changes would make interviews more accessible to readers. For instance, excessive false starts and filler words were removed when they did not materially affect the meaning of the ideas expressed by the interviewee.
- In accord with standard oral history practices, interviewees were allowed to review their transcripts, although they were encouraged to avoid making substantial editorial revisions and deletions that would change the conversational style of the transcripts or the ideas expressed therein.
- The editors welcomed additional notes, comments, or written observations that the interviewees wished to insert into the record and noted any substantial changes or redactions to the transcript.
- Copy-editing of the transcripts was based on the standards set forth in *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

The first reference to a Member of Congress (House or Senate) is underlined in the oral history transcript. For more information about individuals who served in the House or Senate, please refer to the online *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*, [http://bioguide.congress.gov](http://bioguide.congress.gov) and the “People Search” section of the History, Art & Archives website, [http://history.house.gov](http://history.house.gov).

For more information about the U.S. House of Representatives oral history program contact the Office of House Historian at (202) 226-1300, or via email at [history@mail.house.gov](mailto:history@mail.house.gov).

Citation Information

When citing this oral history interview, please use the format below:
Interviewer Biography

Albin J. Kowalewski is a Senior Historical Editor with the Office of the Historian, U.S. House of Representatives.
KOWALEWSKI: [This interview took place on May 18, 2011.] All right, so Mr. Varey, you spent a long time on the Hill, Secret Service.

VAREY: Quite a few years, yes. I was the—about nine and a half years, almost 10 years—Secret Service liaison to the House and Senate there at the Capitol. So I spent many years up there in my capacity as the liaison for Secret Service.

KOWALEWSKI: Okay.

VAREY: Worked quite closely with the Capitol Police as well as the Sergeants at Arms of both the House and the Senate.

KOWALEWSKI: And you became House Sergeant at Arms about five years before you became the Chief of the Capitol Police, correct?

VAREY: Right. I went back, as I retired from the Secret Service in January of 1995, and was hired as the Deputy Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives several days after retiring. About January 11th of 1995 is when I was, I think, assumed the position of Deputy Sergeant at Arms.

KOWALEWSKI: Okay. So you’ve been pretty familiar with security protocols on the Hill, and I was wondering if you could give us a narrative of your day on Tuesday, September 11, 2001, and how that may have been a drastic change, so to speak, from what you were accustomed to.

VAREY: On the morning of September 11th, 2001, at that time, I was the Police Chief of the U.S. Capitol Police. I was on my way into work, in the cruiser, listening to the WTOP newscast and heard on the radio that a plane had collided with one of the World Trade Center Towers, and at the time what
went through my mind was, it sounded to me like, a possibly private aircraft had clipped one of the Towers. Didn’t think anything of it, but I did go directly to the command center there at the U.S. Capitol Police Headquarters just to check and at that time determined that it was a commercial airline that had collided with the Tower.

In the process of watching the news coverage, just minutes after arriving there at the command center, we saw on the TV a second plane collide with the second Tower. At that point in time, we realized that this was more, just more than a freak accident, and in our state of alertness due to the terrorism issues at that time, we immediately contacted FAA to determine from their standpoint what was going on. Also, at the same time, contacted the FBI. While we were there, in phone conversation with these other agencies, we happened to glance up and saw a huge plume of smoke out the window coming from down on the Mall, in the vicinity of the Pentagon. At that point in time, we realized that a third plane had collided, and it crashed into the Pentagon. In conversations with FAA, we asked them if they could give us an accounting of the aircraft that were in our airspace. They eventually, over a period of time, gave us updates as to how they were faring with accounting for the aircraft that were in the air.

Sometime, shortly after that, we had received word that there were several planes that they had not been able to account for. During the interim, as we’re waiting for more information, we activated our emergency recall plan and activated our state of alertness over there at the Capitol with our people that were on post. And we also, of course, informed the police board who in turn informed the leadership of what intelligence we had up to that point. Bill Livingood was the, and still is, I gather, the House Sergeant at Arms, and at that time, we had a brand-new Sergeant at Arms on the Senate side who
was Al Lenhardt. So they came over to the command center to monitor the situation with us, as I recall. At that point, shortly after that, we had received word that there was a problem on a plane heading from Pittsburgh towards Washington, and at that point, we began to realize that they’re targeting specific locations. So we informed the police board that we have this problem with the plane coming from Pittsburgh, so at some point in time, the Sergeants at Arms decided that it was prudent to evacuate the Capitol.

However, I guess there was some confusion as to whether both Houses were going to evacuate, whether the Senate was going to evacuate, or whether the House was going to evacuate, and I gather that the respective Sergeants at Arms were discussing this with the leadership, as we were monitoring this situation there at our command center. Eventually, the leadership over on the Senate side, unbeknownst to the House side, decided to evacuate the Capitol building. The evacuation then ensued. I had received a telephone call from Bill Livingood asking what was the Senate doing, and they had heard that the Senate was evacuating. And I informed Bill that yes, as a matter of fact, the Senate was evacuating. So, at that point in time, they determined that it was prudent to evacuate the House side of the Capitol. And as things got more intense, it was decided that we should evacuate the office buildings, from the House and Senate side, just to be on the safe side and get people away from the Capitol in general. So an evacuation was in effect literally for the entire Capitol complex.

Much confusion ensued during the evacuation process. The phones, of course, were ringing off the hook. People requesting updates and information and so forth. The other thing that eventually happened was the phone lines went down because of the overwhelming usage of the phones. Fortunately, at that point in time, we installed a system there with our police officers, and
particularly the sergeants, that have the ability to communicate not on the commercial phone lines, but through lines we had set up, you know, there at the Capitol. So, in essence, we were able to communicate to our people that are in the field. At that point in time, after a notification of all of our police officers, which took basically some time to do, and we had then decided along with the police board that we would increase the security at the Capitol, and we would go into 12-hour shifts. So, over the period of time, from that afternoon on, in essence, we were planning the increase in manpower in terms of securing the Capitol and the Capitol grounds.

We initiated a telephone call with the Secret Service to discuss the issue of the presidential lineage in terms of the Speaker and his responsibility relative to their plans. So it was decided that we would relocate the Speaker, which in effect took place. We assembled the Members that decided to stay, both the House and the Senate Members, over at Capitol Police headquarters. Basically, we had the House Members in one location, at Capitol Police headquarters, and then we had the Senators that were still on board, which roughly about 40 or 50 of them assembled, there in the Senate roll call room, where the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate Al Lenhardt would give them periodic briefings as to what was going on at that time. We took some of the senior Members of the committee, chairmen, and turned the police chief’s conference room over to them, and, again, both the two Sergeants at Arms would brief the leadership of the House and Senate as things progressed.

Needless to say, the confusion was just certainly overwhelming. I might add that—When we took over the, when Bill Livingood and I assumed our positions at the House Sergeant at Arms office, we realized that given the fact that we had had a recent bombing in 1994 at the World Trade Center, we had had several bombings of embassies and the Khobar Towers overseas,
worldwide terrorism was a number one priority with most of the federal and local law enforcement agencies. We decided at that point in time, the police board did, that we needed to upgrade the Capitol Police Department to prepare them to deal with terrorism. I felt, as did the police board, that the U.S. Capitol is a very symbolic target to terrorists. And in our travels, in our capacity as Secret Service agents overseas, oftentimes the backdrop to the news, TV news reportage, you would see a picture of the U.S. Capitol in the background, and that kind of gave focus, we think at least, to the terrorists in terms of what’s more symbolic of the United States of America than the U.S. Capitol, and it’s a symbol of democracy, and so forth.

So, given that, we decided we needed to upgrade the police department. Certainly, we needed more personnel, but above all, we needed to train to deal with the terrorist threat. We established both a domestic and a foreign intelligence unit within the Capitol Police, the liaison with the federal agencies, that were by mandate, you know, gathering intelligence as it dealt with terrorism. They were feeding us information, and we were certainly responding based on the information that we received. We also realized that the screening process at the U.S. Capitol was in need of an upgrade, so we focused on that. We had a game plan to focus on screening, which eventually led to a new visitor’s center. Another area in which the Capitol Police sorely needed help was in the technical security end dealing with the alarms, and cameras, and other sophisticated security equipment, which at that time, was much needed there at the Capitol. We focused on the ability to control the checkpoints there at the U.S. Capitol building. We also trained, at that point in time, shortly after 1995, in the chem-bio [chemical-biological] arena. Chem-bio terrorism was certainly a big concern with us, and we started initiating evacuation drills there at the Capitol in the wee hours of the morning. We would liaison with the federal authorities, as well as the
military, to deal with a potential chemical or biological attack at the Capitol, and we exercised our game plan over a period of time.

So, in that regard, by the time 9/11 rolled around, we were certainly on our way. We weren’t caught flat-footed, so to speak, in the entirety. So the evacuation drills from the Capitol extended into 9/11. One of the outcomes of 9/11 was the fact that we realized that we didn’t have any evacuation plans for the office buildings, both in the House and Senate, and had we had evacuation plans for those particular buildings there would probably have been less confusion, certainly some confusion, but less confusion, in evacuating those buildings. So, in the weeks after that, each building, we had the Capitol police design evacuation plans. And evacuation coordinators, along with the staff, in the process of initiating the evacuation plan, we needed to set up some type of training program for the staffs relative to what to do in a crisis such as we experienced in 9/11. That all came about as a result of 9/11.

KOWALEWSKI: Well, despite the confusion and the office buildings, it sounds like most of that day followed the procedures you had in place. I mean, it sounded like the Capitol Police were prepared, given that—

VAREY: They were prepared. Some of the things that happened after that—I think if you probably recall the following, I believe it was a Thursday, over on the Senate side, we had received a call from one of the leaders’ offices, over there, saying that they had an odor, a strange odor, coming from a room located just below their offices. Apparently, one of their staff members noticed it, so they reported it to the police. The police department went down and checked it, and sure as could be, there was a strange odor. So we got our bomb unit with their dogs to respond down there, and the dogs alerted on a locker down there, and of course that got out, and caused somewhat of a mild
panic. It somehow got out to the media. The media had assembled on the plaza at that point in time. The Senate Sergeant at Arms Al Lenhardt was out there, trying to answer questions that were initiated by the press, relative to what was going on concerning this search.

So I was called over to the plaza, and I responded over there, and I’m talking with the inspector in charge of the Capitol building. The search was ongoing. The bomb people eventually determined that the dogs had alerted on a brand-new pair of boots, work boots, that were in a locker down below. Work boots put out a butane-type odor because of their newness and so forth, and that, in essence, is what caused the other dogs to alert. So, at 6:00 at night, the press, it’s primetime, and they were announcing that there was a potential for a bomb or whatever to go off on the Senate side, which certainly wasn’t the case. But it certainly caused a mild panic amongst the people on the Senate side because they eventually had to re-evacuate the Senate side again.

But anyway, so that was resolved, thank God to our satisfaction. And, of course, we were still monitoring the situation in New York. We had, at that point in time, had gone up to New York. I had taken several of the members of the police department up there to participate in some of their training exercises as it pertained to primarily chem-bio attacks on specific targets. So we had the privilege of working with the authorities in New York City, at that point in time, relative to our training procedures, and we were able to establish a liaison with the people up in New York to try to keep tabs of what was going on relative to the situation up there.

But, needless to say, for days on end after that, our people were working 12-hour shifts with no days off. So the difficulty there is the fact that the longer these people work, they diminish in terms of their ability to perform because
of the long hours and so forth and so forth. So that was a concern of ours.

Not too long after that, I think on the 17th of October, we were hit with another crisis dealing with the anthrax and that further strained our ability to provide security to the Capitol.

**KOWALEWSKI:** You know, that brings up an interesting point, because there were debates about whether or not to bring in the military to help—

**VAREY:** Right, that came about—our people had been working straight through, 12-hour shifts, right on through the anthrax crisis. The anthrax crisis occurred on October the 17th, and well into, I believe it was December, they were still working the 12-hour shifts. As we got into the latter part of, into November, mid-November and so forth, we decided that we would, we could not sustain that 12-hour shift, seven days a week. So we established a rotation where we would give the individuals one day off, and still, at that point in time, for a number of posts that were established as an outcome of 9/11 and the anthrax crisis. We knew that we couldn’t man all of these posts indefinitely, so it was discussed amongst the board. I think the Senate Sergeant at Arms proposed using the DC National Guard to supplement the perimeter posts that are maintained by the Capitol Police in order to give us a break, and also to get our people back to eight-hour shifts and give them their two days off. We had also had discussions about the possibility of bringing in a federal support, such as the U.S. Marshals and other federal agencies, to help maintain the post, but I can’t recall for what reasons where they decided that it was more preferable to use, use the National Guard. We had roughly about 120 National Guard troops working with us, I think, from somewhere around the first or second week of December until the crisis abated.

We also called—during the course of both 9/11 and the anthrax crisis, we were working very closely with the DC government and the police
department and fire department, I might add, as well as their rescue units. Prior to 9/11, we had practiced evacuation drills from the Capitol, and we also utilized, in our training exercises, the DC fire department since we knew that they were the principal agency to respond to fire or any type of calamity that would occur there at the Capitol. And we’d also liaised with the military for excavation services, should one of our buildings get blown up, and collapse, and so forth. So we had a game plan there to coordinate with the military to provide the necessary resources to deal with that.

KOWALEWSKI: Well, there was some pushback, wasn’t there? That the whole idea of bringing the military into the United States Capitol would seem to close it off to the American public, right?

VAREY: Sure. Yes, well the big issue, particularly for when the 9/11 crisis occurred, was that the leadership of both the House and Senate had wanted to let the public know that the U.S. government was still operating, in particular the legislative branch of government. So it’s imperative to get back to normalcy as soon as possible, and this was the urgency associated with the leadership in terms of getting the police department to bring this about.

KOWALEWSKI: There are also reports that some Capitol police officers came into work on September 11th, even though it was their day off.

VAREY: Oh definitely, yes. There’s no question about it. Just as an aside, I cannot commend the Capitol Police Department enough, the men and women of the department, both the sworn officers and the civilians, for the services that they provided during that period of time, both 9/11 and for the anthrax crisis. It was above and beyond the call of duty, so to speak, because many of them came in on their own to volunteer to help even though they had not yet
received the call to work specific assignments. They were there on the scene, and they were very eagerly participating in our evacuation plans.

**KOWALEWSKI:** What was the mood like, among the officers?

**VAREY:** The mood was very positive. Positive in the sense that they realized that they had their duties to perform, and that they, the staff, and the visitors there at the Capitol were looking for the people in uniforms for directions. So they stepped up to the plate, they prevented panic, which was certainly there lingering in the wings, and a lot of people relied on the police department in terms of what shall I do, where shall I go, and so forth. And so the mood was, I guess in military terms, it was gung-ho. We got a job to do, and here’s the crisis, and this is what we’ve trained for all these years, and it’s finally arrived.

**KOWALEWSKI:** You mentioned that the officers helped prevent this sense of panic, and in these situations, often a rumor comes into play.

**VAREY:** Definitely, yes.

**KOWALEWSKI:** And a misdirection of information. So I’m curious to know where the Capitol Police, and the headquarters in particular, where you guys are getting the bulk of your information during September 11th, and then how it was that the organization dealt with the press. Dan Nichols, Lieutenant Dan Nichols, he’s mentioned in almost every article dealing with September 11th.

**VAREY:** It was decided that we needed a spokesperson, and we needed one voice speaking for the entire congressional community. So, the decision was, well, do we have the chief do it, or do we have a spokesperson do it. Lieutenant Nichols at the time was the spokesperson for the U.S. Capitol Police, and we decided that he should remain the spokesperson for the Capitol Police community as it pertained to the security issues. I could very well have done
it, but I just didn’t have the time, given what was going on, to devote to
dealing with the press, and the millions of questions that were arising
continuously. So that’s why we decided we would appoint Dan Nichols, and he
did yeoman’s work, and was very admirable in terms of the job that he did, in
terms of keeping the press apprised of what was going on.

But we would meet daily there, both morning and evening, to go over issues,
and what was happening, and so forth. We also realized, that as an outcome
of this thing here, and particularly more so in the anthrax crisis, that we
needed to establish a line of communications with the people that were
calling in to inquire about what to do, what they saw, etc. So we established a
hot fax system, a hotline so to speak, that could be called by any House or
Senate employee to get updates in terms, also to get the latest releases that
were being put out by the police department. So the hot fax system came
about during the course of the anthrax crisis. It worked, I might add, once it
was in place, it worked very well in terms of keeping people apprised.

The criticisms, which were many—one of the big criticisms that we got of
our agency, the police department, was the fact that we didn’t communicate
well with the community as a whole. We went around after that, of course,
particularly during the anthrax crisis, to all of the offices, Members’ offices,
and established a liaison with them, and we even set up training programs
which proved to be valuable, particularly as it pertained to the anthrax crisis.
We had established training programs for the staff, and the respective
Members’ offices, on how to deal with people that were deranged, that would
come into the office, or people that were mentally unbalanced, or how to
deal with threat letters, or suspect packages, and so forth. So we had a
training program in place that the staff who had to deal with these people or
had to deal with the mail and so forth, knew what to do should a situation
arise. And the young lady that handled the anthrax letter in Senator [Thomas Andrew] Daschle’s office had in fact been part of our training program and knew what to do immediately. As soon as she opened the letter and saw what was in it, she picked up the phone, and our people were there, I guess, in less than three minutes.

KOWALEWSKI: Yes, that was a pretty, that was a pretty traumatic day.

VAREY: Oh God, was it ever.

KOWALEWSKI: We can, well, let’s continue to talk about 9/11 real quick before we go on.

VAREY: Yes, sure.

KOWALEWSKI: Because I have a few questions about anthrax, as well.

VAREY: Go ahead, yes.

KOWALEWSKI: So, during the morning, you were in constant communication with FAA, with the FBI, with the leadership. They whisked away Speaker [John Dennis] Hastert, and the House leadership, and then the Senate leadership, to follow to secure location. But then a lot of the Members gathered on the East Front of the Capitol that afternoon and that evening.

VAREY: Right, right.

KOWALEWSKI: What were the main concerns there? How did you react?

VAREY: We were concerned about, you know, we still hadn’t had a handle on the situation, in terms of what we thought the terrorists would be doing. So we did have some concern about them assembling on the Capitol steps, but, again, coming back to their efforts to give the American public the knowledge that the legislative branch of government was not destroyed or
dead, that we were functioning, that we were performing our duties as the American public would expect, and that was one of the reasons that the demonstration—I don’t want to call it a demonstration, but the assemblage of the Members on the steps of the Capitol, and basically, it was to get the message out to the American public, that we’re here, we’re functioning, and we’re not going to be deterred.

KOWALEWSKI: I take it you didn’t get a lot of sleep that night, September 11th?

VAREY: No, as a matter of fact, I didn’t go home.

KOWALEWSKI: Wow.

VAREY: I stayed there in the office and on through the night, and I would go back to my office for an hour here or an hour there to catnap in the chair and just wait for further developments. I didn’t actually go home until, oh, it was almost midnight, of the following day before I got out of the Capitol. We were constantly on the telephones with the Washington field office, the agent in charge of the Washington field office, monitoring the situations there in the Washington area. We were on the telephone with the FBI command and control center, there at FBI headquarters. We were talking to the FBI officials. We were talking to FAA authorities continually during the course of the afternoon, and the evening, and the following days of the situation, to assess what had transpired and what had happened. They, I might add, were very good in terms of feeding us the intelligence that they had. It was a very extensive, collaborative effort, on the part of all of the agencies involved.

We, as I recall also, established, enhanced our command and control center there at police headquarters. They brought in people from other agencies and set them up with stations there at our command and control center. We had the Metropolitan Police there, we had the FBI representation there, we had
Secret Service representation there. It just went on and on and on. FAA had people there and so forth, so that we didn’t have to get on the phone ourselves and wait. We could just reach out to the people that were working with us, in our command center, and ask them to track this rumor down, or track that rumor down, or can you give us an update on what you have relative to this intelligence or that intelligence. So, as the days wore on, the number of people that we had in our command center increased, and of course they were working 12-hour shifts too.

**KOWALEWSKI:** Wow. You were there for over, for over 24 hours.

**VAREY:** Well, I mean, the situation dictated it. From a personal standpoint, your adrenaline’s kicked in, and you’re operating on adrenaline. I did not have time to think about anything else other than, what is our next step, what is our next move, and have we done this, or have we done that, and so forth. Our answer to inquiries coming from, God, everybody and his brother wanted to know what was going on at the Capitol. There was no doubt in our mind that the plane coming in from Pittsburgh was headed for the Capitol. There’s no question in our mind, and we were on pins and needles as the FAA were tracking that plane, as it came closer and closer to the Capitol. We had asked FAA, as I recall, the speed of the aircraft, and an ETA in terms of its arrival there in the city of Washington. So as we got closer to that ETA, of course, the tension mounts.

And then it wasn’t, I can’t recall, how much time had passed, but it wasn’t much longer when we were advised by the FAA that the plane went down in a field in Pennsylvania. I hate to say this, much to our relief. Certainly not a thing to be saying, but you can certainly be concerned. And, I think here again, we get back to symbolic targets, and I think that the plane that hit the—in my opinion, this is strictly an opinion on my part, it has no basis in
fact—but I had thought, and still do, that the plane that hit the Pentagon was bound to, the target was the White House. The difficulty for a pilot—in having flown in and out of the south grounds of the White House in a helicopter when I was assigned to the President’s detail there at the White House—the White House is a very difficult building to pick out from the air because of the foliage and whatnot, let alone doing it with a helicopter. But when you’re doing it with an aircraft, an airliner, you just don’t have the time to focus unless you know the coordinates, and you know exactly where the building’s located. I think that the Pentagon was an alternate target, but that’s, here again, I say that as an opinion on my part, and it’s certainly not a basis in fact.

KOWALEWSKI: Okay. Well, the next big event, so the speak, after 9/11, was the Joint Meeting on September 20th, when President Bush came to the House Chamber.

VAREY: Oh God, yes, yes.

KOWALEWSKI: What were the—

VAREY: Talk about ratcheting up security. We had everybody and his brother there in some security capacity or another. Here again, our command and control center was just loaded with people that had some role to play, in some aspect of security, and we had had military support units on standby. I won’t really go into it because it’s a classified program, but we had every conceivable thing that you could think of, to prepare ourselves to deal with a crisis, should it happen during the President’s State of the Union Address. I’m not sure if you were there at the time, but we reconfigured rooms there at the Capitol to address specific security issues. Our evacuation routes were run over and over and over again, and briefings, so it was a, I don’t want to call it
a security nightmare, but the security established for that particular visit was far beyond what we had done previously, for previous State of the Unions, or for that matter the inaugurations.

**KOWALEWSKI:** Vice President [Richard Bruce] Cheney did not attend that. He was kept in a secure location—

**VAREY:** Right, and that’s part of the presidential successive program, generally one of the members of the Cabinet, under normal conditions, would be set up at a particular location as part of the continuity of government program. At that time, Cheney was delegated as the person that would be that individual. The Speaker of the House—I was mentioning about his evacuation—he’s part of the presidential successive program. The custody of that program is with the Secret Service, and this is one of the responsibilities that I had when I was the Secret Service liaison there at the Capitol. So even though the Speaker of the House had his own security detail, once the President initiated the plan, the successor plan, and the evacuation was effected, then we had to hook up and liaison with the Secret Service because they brought on their own assets, communications assets, security assets, transportation assets, and so forth. So that was also part of the, you know, 9/11 issue.

**KOWALEWSKI:** Okay. So I’m curious, one last question about 9/11. How did it influence the way the Capitol Police Force recruited after that?

**VAREY:** {laughter} We didn’t have any problems. {laughter} Well, money has always been an issue, money and training has always been an issue with the Capitol Police. When I was sworn in there as the police chief, my speech to the Capitol Police community, as well as the congressional community, was that my principal focus as police chief was to get the tools, the money, and the people necessary to upgrade the police department and security there at the
Capitol. And the police department, up until that point in time, was always having problems in trying to get money.

The Members, the committees, were very frugal in terms of how they spent money, and I think part of their thought processes was, that they didn’t want to give the American public the impression that they were being lavish in terms of spending money on themselves by spending all this money on themselves as it dealt with security. Our position was that we’re not only protecting the Members of Congress, but we’re protecting everybody that comes to the Capitol. We were protecting not only individuals, but we were protecting a democratic process, the ability of the people to come to the Capitol. So that was our focus, in terms of trying to get more people. We certainly needed more people in the police department.

We needed money to initiate training programs. At that point in time, we didn’t even have a training facility. All of our training was done in the House office buildings in the wee hours of the evening, and, oftentimes, our people, when they get into the training programs, ended up going into public restrooms to change into our training attire. So that had always been a bug-a-boo in my mind, that if you want first-rate security, and if you want people to be dedicated to the job that they were doing, you had to give them the tools and the training to do it. So that was our focus.

When 9/11 came along, we got the undivided attention of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, in terms of dedicating more funding to the programs that we felt that the Capitol Police needed. And, by and large, the majority of the Members jumped on board in terms of supporting the [Capitol] Police Department.
It was further emphasized when we went through the anthrax crisis, and no sooner did the crisis occur than the House stepped up to the plate. The staff director for our Appropriations Committee came right over to my office and said, “How much money do you need?” I said, “I don’t have any idea, but what I basically need is an open checking account to pay for the stuff that we don’t have, that we can need to purchase on an emergency basis.” She said, “Well, we’re going to appropriate you $30 million for starters, and should you need more money we’ll certainly take care of that.” So these two crises, I think, in terms of what the Capitol Police were doing, and what the Capitol Police was all about, brought the level of security and the level of professionalism that—

KOWALEWSKI: So, in the build up to the anthrax crisis at the Capitol, there had been a death in Florida. And then there had been another letter sent to Tom Brokaw’s office in New York.

VAREY: Right.

KOWALEWSKI: With—Did the Capitol Police, were they monitoring the situation? You had said that they, that you all put in procedures, especially for chem and bio attacks.

VAREY: Right.

KOWALEWSKI: And so I’m curious to know.

VAREY: We were monitoring it, but it didn’t tweak anything at the time. We were involved in training to deal with chem and bio terrorism. You know, prior to the anthrax attack we were training with the military. And we were certainly aware of the different chemicals and bacteria that was out there that could do harm or should it get loose. And we were certainly made aware of this in our
training observations up in New York City with the New York City Police Department. So, but you know, we didn’t really think at that time that it was at the top of the heap in terms of our concerns.

**KOWALEWSKI:** Okay.

**VAREY:** I might add that because of the training that we had, that our people that had responded to Senator Daschle’s office had done field tests, and did three to confirm that at, from all appearances, it appeared to be anthrax. And you know 10 years or five years prior to that, we probably wouldn’t have had those capabilities. But we couldn’t say definitely that was anthrax because we had to send it off to the labs up at Fort Detrick [Maryland], and it was about three days before they came back to advise us, yes, in fact it was anthrax. But our people handled it as if it were anthrax. Our response to the crisis was done based on how we would train to respond to an anthrax attack.

**KOWALEWSKI:** Interesting. The CDC, the Center[s] for Disease Control, kind of came under some flack during this whole thing because partly, because of the test results as well as the severity of the anthrax strain that it was thousands of times more deadly than the type of anthrax sent to Tom Brokaw’s office or that resulted in the death in Florida.

**VAREY:** Yes.

**KOWALEWSKI:** What kind of relationship did you build with—did the Capitol Police Force build with other external agencies like the CDC?

**VAREY:** Oh, God. We had probably about 400 agencies—I’m not exaggerating—about 400 agencies; both civilian, government, and military call us saying they wanted to help when it was announced that we were dealing with the anthrax. They were coming out of the woodwork. This presented a
monumental problem to us, the police board, and to the police department. About 95–98 percent of these agencies we never interacted with in any capacity. I didn’t know who they were, what their responsibilities were, or what jurisdictions that they had. Were they federal agencies?

So this presented a real dilemma to us. Who are the proper authorities that we should have onboard to deal with this issue? I mean the gamut of agencies that we ended up dealing with, I don’t know. If I’ve got some notes here, I could rattle off some of the agencies that we dealt with during the course of this thing here. In addition to our own agencies, the Attending Physician’s Office and the Sergeants at Arms Offices and so forth, plus leaderships we had Postal Inspectors, we had the Environmental Protection Agency, the CDC the U.S. Public Health Service, DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], the National Institute of Occupational Safety, the U.S. Army Research Institute, Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incidence Response Force, Walter Reed, the Fed and Naval Office, the Air Force, District of Columbia Police Department, District of Columbia Public Health Department. So it went on and on and on and on. And those that I just read off to you were agencies that we brought on board. And I might say there was an act of God that occurred during the course of this crisis. When the anthrax crisis occurred, we appointed Deputy Chief [of the Capitol Police] Jim Rohan as the Incident Commander. So most of these phone calls were being directed to him that were coming in about what these agencies wanted to do, and what their capacity was, and what their legal authorities were, and so forth.

So it wasn’t too long after being inundated with all of this information, plus dealing with the crisis at hand, and the handling of the evidence, and dealing
with the health issues and whatnot that Deputy Chief Rohan came into my office, and he said, “Chief, this is beyond and above my scope of abilities.” And I had to admire him for stepping up to the plate to say this was the case.

And, however, it left me with a dilemma. Who the hell are we going to appoint as the Incident Commander? Shortly before Deputy Chief Rohan had come into my office, I had a resume on my desk that I had read earlier that morning. It was sent over to me by the House Sergeant at Arms Bill Livingood.

Prior to the anthrax crisis, we were considering bringing somebody on board that had a background in this type of terrorism, chem-bio terrorism, and on my desk was a resume from Dr. Doug [Stutz]. Stutz was from Florida, he was very familiar with the anthrax case in Florida and that was his field and his forte. So the light bulb went on shortly after Chief Rohan had left. And I said, “Oh my God.” I said, “This might be the man.” I reviewed the resume. I went over to Bill Livingood’s office, I dropped the resume back on his desk. I explained to him what the situation was relative to the fact that we, the police department, did not have the capabilities to coordinate the response to this particular attack. We could handle the security and the criminal investigative end of it, no question about it. But we couldn’t handle the health issues, the remediation issues, the relocation issues—just tons and tons of stuff that we felt were above and beyond the call of the police department.

I convinced Bill, who was chair of the police board, I believe, at that time. I’m not quite sure at the moment. So we then talked to Al [Lenhardt]. Lenhardt said he had to get—since he was new—he said he had to get permission of the leadership since this was a recommendation coming from the House. Okay, so we finally had concurrence. We talked to Dr. Stutz, and he agreed to accept the position as the Incident Commander for the anthrax
response. And [he] signed a contract, and we brought him onboard. I think, as I said, the good Lord was looking after us because he did yeoman’s work in terms of pulling all of this together. He was familiar with all of the other agencies, the federal agencies, that played an integral part of dealing with the anthrax.

The anthrax presented a challenge to the police department, a couple of challenges. And well, we seized the evidence, along with the—we brought the FBI. And when we determined that we thought it was anthrax, their chem bio unit responded to the Capitol immediately and worked closely with us. We seized the evidence, the powder on the floor at Daschle’s office, turned it over to the FBI. Okay, that was taken care of. The evidentiary aspects and chain of command was taken care of, which was all under the purview of law enforcement.

However, we suddenly realized we have a medical issue here. Something that we were not used to dealing with. However, backing up a little bit, during the course of our exercises there at the Capitol, we had brought in the Attending Physician’s staff and office as part of our training exercise to deal with responses like chem bio, to deal with responses like injuries from explosions, and so forth. So, as we trained and pre-trained, the Attending Physician’s Office was an integral part of our training phase. When the powder was dropped, we notified them, they immediately responded to Senator Daschle’s suite; they sent their people over. We, in turn, got with them to discuss what do we do now relative to the medical issues associated with exposure to the anthrax? So they immediately activated their plan and set up stations where they could swab the congressional staff that were working in the [Hart] Building. And as it turned out during the—and this was done immediately. As they started doing the swabbing of the people that
were in the building, the people who were working there, we determined that there were about 31 people that had anthrax spores in their nostrils. They did swabs of the nostrils and so forth, and it was determined that 31 people had been exposed to the anthrax virus. So now, you got an issue of how to deal with these people. Do you quarantine them? Well, the people that were in the Daschle’s office, we had to decontaminate them. They fortunately had showers there in the Hart Building. We had to provide them with new clothing, we had to take their clothing, bag it, and hold it for evidence and so forth, also turned it over to the FBI.

And then we had another issue there was we didn’t want to have a panic occur within the community there. We went about systematically setting up these stations to have people examined. They set up stations to pass out [Cipro] to the staff that were working in the [building] and exposed to the anthrax, and as well as those that were working in the Hart Building. And thereafter, later on, decided as a precaution that anybody on the Hill—particularly after we determined that there was cross-contamination in the mails—that anybody that worked on the Hill that had an ID card could come to one of the Attending Physician’s stations, be swabbed, and be given a three day’s supply of [Cipro].

And rather ironically, [laughter] people that had worked on the Hill, that had kept their old ID card started showing up in the lines to get it because apparently there was a run on Cipro when the media had put out that this was the drug of choice when dealing with anthrax. So some staff members showed up that no longer worked there but had their old ID cards. The Attending Physician’s Office just stepped into the breach and got that going.

Okay, once that program was underway, the Capitol Police were confronted with remediation. What do we do with the situation that we have on hand?
How do we get rid of it? Well, there wasn’t an agency out there that has had to deal with anthrax remediation as we found out. So it was OJT, on-the-job training. And we assembled scientists from all over the medical community there as part of our committee that was addressing the anthrax issue. And we also determined just prior to getting to that point that we were going to need other agencies to step into the breach, and I might rattle off some of these agencies. At that point in time, we realized that we didn’t have enough space to assemble this large group of people. At that time, we were operating out of the old Senate daycare center across the street from Capitol Police headquarters on D Street. And eventually, that place became overwhelmed with the number of people that we had to bring onboard. So the Architect [of the Capitol] proposed that we utilize the just newly renovated [Capitol] Botanical Gardens, which worked out well because it was big, it was spacious, it had parking. We set up a command and control center there at the Botanical Gardens. So that was one of the things that we had to focus on.

The other thing that we had to focus on was the police department, was chain of custody as we determined that there was extensive cross-contamination of the mails. We learned that there were seven buildings, Capitol buildings, that were infected with the anthrax. And in gathering the anthrax, we had to—as evidence, it had to be labeled, marked, and we had to set up a computer system just to keep track of, we seized over 10,000 samples initially from all of the 26 buildings there on Capitol Hill, and that was just the initial sampling, was 10,000. Every one of those samplings had to be taken to the laboratory at Fort Detrick at first, and they had to be in police custody as part of the chain of custody for evidentiary procedures should that thing go to trial. So we had to escort this stuff all the way up to Fort Detrick. We had to establish a transportation unit to do nothing but transfer the samplings up to Fort Detrick.
Later on, we brought on board Walter Reed [Hospital], and the laboratories out at Bethesda Naval Hospital to help examine the anthrax. And as we progressed months into this thing here, we didn’t have to wait the three days that we normally waited. They had developed a process where they could identify it within a day, so that was part of the thing. Then the other issue is what do you do with all this furniture, clothing, artifacts, whatever that’s exposed to the anthrax and these offices, and so forth. And then after you decide what you’re going to do with it, how do you treat the waste? What are you going to do with the waste? The accumulation of 300,000 gallons of waste that had to be dealt with once this thing was on the downhill side.

All the while that we were addressing these issues—we, the [Capitol] Police Department and the Capitol Police Board—we were receiving constant pressure from the House and Senate leadership. When are you going to—once we determined there was cross-contamination, we had closed down all of the Capitol buildings and evacuated them. And we were constantly being pressured by the leadership, “When are you going to open these offices up? We need to get back to the public to let them know that we’re functioning.”

Well, that was another issue too that the police department was presented with. We had to relocate the House and Senate, and we had to bring people from GSA [General Services Administration] and from the executive branch to help us to locate office space downtown—space over at the military base there in Southeast Washington. In order to get the legislative branch of government up and functioning, that required leasing or purchasing computers, fax machines, Xerox machines, telephones, and reestablishing communications—setting up new phones and so forth.

All this was ongoing, and the Capitol Police played a role in this too because the buildings had to be secured. A security plan had to be established for the
Members as they met in these locations and so forth. So this was sort of an involving process, and as I mentioned, it was sort of OJT. The Capitol Police is unique now. It’s the only police agency in the world that has had to deal with and has handled anthrax from start to finish.

**KOWALEWSKI:** What could, what goes into—you kind of talked about setting up an auxiliary facility for a lot of the staff members and whatnot. Was the Capitol Police at all involved in essentially the fumigation of the Hart Building when they released chlorine gas to wipe out the anthrax?

**VAREY:** Now we were involved in it in a sense that all we did was set up security perimeters around the building. Here again, you know you may not have been there at the time, but we had to set up perimeters around all of the buildings to inhibit people from entering the buildings. Anybody that entered the building without adequately suiting up with a specially designed response suit that our respondents were wearing would have to be decontaminated. We had to set up showers on different locations around the Capitol Hill, so that if anybody went into the building, or slipped into a building for some reason or other, we had to decontaminate that person once they came out.

The interesting thing about the anthrax is the fact that they classified it as a weapons-grade anthrax. And the terminology that they used was it was “irresoluble,” meaning that the anthrax was so light that it just hovered in the air, and this presented a problem for us. You know how dust hovers in the air, and you get it on your computer screen, or you get it on your TV screen? Well, that’s what was happening with the anthrax. In going back to Daschle’s office—When I was called, and they were telling me that the initial test indicated anthrax, I went lickety-split up to Daschle’s office, up to the sixth floor. Went in, and there were about a dozen of us standing around looking
at this powder laying on the floor and so forth, so we immediately secured that wing of the building. We had posted our officers at the elevators and at the stairwells to prevent people from coming down into that area.

Unbeknownst to us, as we went in and out of that office, the anthrax would follow us out the door. In other words, your body moves, it creates a small vacuum. Well, the anthrax was sucked into that vacuum, and as we were going down the halls, past the two police posts, we were carrying anthrax with us. As it turns out, when we did the swabbing of the people that were in the building, our two police officers—the one that was down there in the stairwell, and the one that was over by the elevator—they all had anthrax spores in their nostrils when we did the swabbing. So we realized that hey, we’ve got something that’s a hell of a lot more serious because of the potential of cross-contamination.

We had immediately shut down the HVAC system once the powder dropped there in the Hart Building. We felt we had isolated it to that particular wing, but lo and behold we determined that that wasn’t the case when they started tracking the mail. Since that letter came in, it was postmarked, and it came in through the U.S. mail. So we started tracking it back through our mail handling process, both in the House and Senate. And we determined that upon examining the machines that handled the mail, that the machines were contaminated in the [Dirksen] Building and over on the House side also. And then out of Brentwood, the facility out there was heavily contaminated, which I believe later two of their postal workers died from inhalation, and the anthrax had got into the HVAC system there at the Post Office. But the interesting thing about the anthrax was that it was so fine and so thin that it would exude through the pores of a paper in the envelopes. In other words, if the envelope was hit, a dust would come out of the envelope through the
pores in the paper, which in essence was the anthrax spores. So that caused us a lot of problems, and in essence that was the reason why seven of our buildings became contaminated.

The Capitol Police at that point in time, their role was to maintain security in the integrity of the buildings. We had staff people that wanted to go back into their offices ‘cause they wanted to get their prized possessions or they wanted to see their goldfish, or they wanted to take care of their plants. And that became an issue with the Sergeant at Arms and legal counsel. Some of the Members on the Senate side, as I recall, were demanding that they be allowed into their offices, so they could retrieve artwork or retrieve personal items that they wanted to carry out. And the question was do you allow these people? And how do you prohibit a Member of Congress from going into his office? So it was determined at some point and time that a letter would be signed by the disclaimer, by the person wanting to go into the office, the Member wanting to go into the office that we would not—we meaning the police department, the federal agencies that were responding, our incident command people—would not be held liable if something should happen to the person that went into get the artifacts out of their offices. And at one point in time, we had heard that a Member wanted to hire one of the staff people to go in to retrieve a prized pen and pencil set. Fortunately, the staff member had more sense than to go through with that. So these are some of the periphery issues.

The other thing that had to be established, we had to set up an identification system for all of the people that were working the incident. We had to set up an identification system for staff people in the relocated areas so that your security was maintained in that regard. So the Capitol Police Department was pretty, pretty well stretched in terms of what we could and what we
couldn’t do. That’s the reason we had to bring up the National Guard to supplement our perimeter posts because as we went along, more and more demands were being placed on the police department to provide ancillary services you know, to the incident command team.

**KOWALEWSKI:** So I assume you were given a dose of Cipro yourself, given your exposure?

**VAREY:** Oh, yes. I went through the same process, having been in the room there with the anthrax. I went through the same process that staff and our other police officers went through and were given the Cipro. And as it turns out, the Cipro had a very adverse effect on me and many of the others. We were given, I guess, too high a dose of the Cipro, and it was causing a lot of medical issues, which I won’t go into. But the long and short of it was after three, four, five days of taking Cipro, we went back to the Attending Physician’s Office and said that we’re having adverse effects on the Cipro. It’s just not working out well, which we later learned that that was normal. That high dosage of Cipro, there are medical side effects. So they switched us to another antibiotic. It wasn’t amoxicillin—I can’t think of what it was at this point.

**KOWALEWSKI:** Just penicillin?

**VAREY:** But we were switched to another antibiotic, which worked out well. We took that for about a month, and then we were periodically examined by the other doctors at the Attending Physician’s Office. Another thing that happened up also was that as these stations were set up by the Attending Physician’s Office, we had the dispatch police offices over at these stations to maintain an element of control with the people that were demanding to be treated. Some of them were, I would say, overexcited or making extraordinary demands on the people from the Attending Physician’s Office. So, in order to
maintain order, we had—every time they opened up one of these stations, we had to dispatch police officers over there to make sure that it was an orderly process.

Another aspect that we got into was when we decided that—at that point in time, and we had no idea what a remediation process would be in terms of how do you deal with the anthrax, and how do you eliminate it. But once chlorine dioxide gas was decided as the process for dealing with the anthrax, once that process was established, and they realized that they were going to have to literally fumigate the entire Hart Building, which I believe is over 600,000 square feet—how do you fumigate a building that size? When we decided that it was going to be done, a plan had to be established. And part of the plan was to educate the people living on Capitol Hill in the vicinity of the Hart Building. In other words, we had to have a sort of a town hall meeting of all the residents that occupy buildings around the Hart Building to let them know what we were doing, how it was going to be done, and what the aftereffects would be, if any. Then we had to tell them the time that it was going to be done. We did it in the wee hours of the morning, so that we, you know, didn’t attract much attention in the process of doing this. So an education process took place with the people on the Hill itself, and this was done by the police department.

KOWALEWKS: Well, I guess one last question. We’ve been talking for about 75 minutes now.

VAREY: I could go on for a couple more hours.

KOWALEWSKI: [laughter] I was just thinking that. We need to sit down and have a much longer discussion. The decision to irradiate the mail, to kind of preempt any sort of other bio chem attack happening.
VAREY: Right.

KOWALEWSKI: Could you talk a little bit about the process that was involved there? Who was involved in that process? What was the force’s responsibility there?

VAREY: Yes. Our incident command people, the scientists came up with a solution in terms of dealing with the mail. People don’t realize the volume of mail that’s handled at the Capitol both in the House and the Senate. Once we determined that there was cross-contamination within the mails, we had to go around to all of the offices and collect mail and had to hold up mail that was being sent in over the weekend. We held it up. We had to get 55-gallon drums. And I can’t recall the number, but I want to say it was over 300 55-gallon drums. If you could envision the size of the 55-gallon drum, we filled every one of them up with mail that was coming into the Capitol. Also, we had to, with the U.S. Postal Authorities, put a stop on deliveries of mail to the U.S. Capitol, and then at some point in time, we had to reestablish mail communications.

So it was decided that the only way to deal with anthrax in the letters, based on their testing, was to irradiate it. We set up locations around the country, actually, where the incoming mail was sent to these locations up in Prince George’s County, I believe out in some of the other states and so forth where all of the mail going to the House and Senate would have to go through a irradiation process. That became quite controversial, an irradiation process would turn the mail’s color. It would darken it, or yellow it, or brown it. In some cases, if it had a glassine face to it, it would have a tendency to melt it and so forth. And then it also produced a dust, which in some cases staff members were complaining that they were suffering from the dust produced by the irradiation. So we had to literally turn that over to the medical
community, OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration], to deal with it.

The other issue: what do we do with the 300 55-gallon drums of mail? We needed to determine if there were other letters that it came in—other threatening letters with anthrax in the mails that we had seized there in both the House and Senate. We contacted GSA, and they gave us a facility down in Springfield off of 395, an old facility that had huge warehouses. Our group had to configure the warehouses in an assembly line where we could examine every single piece of mail in those 300 drums.

And I believe around November the 16th, in examining one of those 55-gallon drums, our people, meaning our team, came across a letter addressed to Senator Patrick [Joseph] Leahy that had anthrax in it—an even more powerful strain of anthrax, if you could believe it, than the one that was received by Senator Daschle. So that further enhanced the mail screening process and why it took so long to get the mail process back to normal there at the Capitol. We’re just concerned that there were other letters that were out there, possibly mailed to other Members of Congress.

But, needless to say, it was controversial. It caused a lot of heartburn. We had to liaise with FedEx and UPS who were making hundreds of deliveries every day to the Capitol. We had to set up a delivery location where they would deliver the parcels. We had set up trailers in the parking lot, outside of the Senate—former Senate daycare center where all of these parcels were delivered to these trailers. The parcels were then taken by trailer to one of these irradiation locations, and that’s when we would screen the parcels. And then we set up [laughter] sort of a mini-Post Office where staff could come to collect the parcels days and weeks later after the irradiation process had taken place—irradiation and x-ray, I might add.
KOWALEWSKI: I’m just looking at my notes here. Do you want to add anything else at all for today?

VAREY: No, we can probably call it a day if you want and go over your notes, and if you want to do another session, I’ll be amenable to doing another session.

KOWALEWSKI: That would be great. I think you know, given your time spent here on the Hill, you know even before you became [Capitol] Police Chief and had to deal with the 9/11 crisis, I think I’m very much interested in hearing about the rest of your career [laughter] and so I think, I think a longer interview is certainly in order.

VAREY: Oh yes, yes. We had problems with our people, our response people had put the suits on. I guess they call them [Tyvek] suits. And when they responded to locations where they thought that anthrax—But little did they know, at that time we were certainly unaware of it, but the suits themselves were attracting the powder. So, as a result of that, they—if you want to say contaminated their vehicles as well as their lockers when they went back to their operating areas. The lockers would contaminate over in the Ford Building based on the fact that they—the powder and because of its irresolubility had clung to the suits.

We learned a lesson in terms of setting up the showers. So anybody that went into a building with a Tyvek suit had to come through a decontamination process. They had to be washed, and all of that water, we couldn’t let it run into the streets. We had to cycle it into 55-gallon drums and treated as waste. And then the issue of disposing of the waste of the thousands of gallons of water, the furnishings, the computers and whatnot that had to be disposed of. You can’t just take them to an ordinary landfill or turn them over to, let’s say, the DC government. You had to go through the federal agencies to
locate areas that could deal with the waste. We had to ship a lot of the waste
down to Norfolk, Virginia, to the Naval base down there where they have
these high intensity ovens, I guess, to destroy stuff. We had established
convoys with the Virginia State Police to escort this stuff down to the naval
station to dispose of. And then the biological anthrax itself, we had to
establish a procedure up at Fort Detrick to have it destroyed up there. And
then you know, once it goes through this burning process, then you got to go
through another recycling process before they’ll allow it to hit the ground
some place.

KOWALEWSKI: Well, I got one last question, I guess.

VAREY: Yes.

KOWALEWSKI: That you were pretty much responsible for acquiring the Cheltenham facility,
correct?

VAREY: Right. That’s my pride and joy. With anything good on that police
department or that—when I was up there, I started this when I became a
deputy Sergeant at Arms. But that’s the thing that I’m most proud of.

KOWALEWSKI: Was that facility available? My chronology’s off. Was that facility available
prior to 9/11 or was that—

VAREY: No, it came about after 9/11, yes.

KOWALEWSKI: Okay.

VAREY: Yes.

KOWALEWSKI: Well, great. I will certainly be in touch about setting up additional interviews
if you’re interested in them.
VAREY: Sure. Yes, I’d be glad to. It’s good to have this documented. I mean I’ve got my notes here. And one of the things that when I left the police department, I was hired by SAIC, Science Applications International Corporation, and they hired me for one reason: it was because of the anthrax crisis. We were the police agency, and I certainly was the only police chief that had to deal with it. And they provided some of their scientists, by the way, on our committee to, you know, deal with the anthrax. So they asked if I would go around the country to talk about crisis management to different other federal agencies as it pertained to responding to situations like this. I’ve taken extensive notes. It’s just a matter of finding them and going through.